Localchat is a simple and lightweight chat application. It's primary purpose is to provide a means to have a multi-user Off-The-Record transient chat, minimising the likelihood that anyone but the chat participants has even a record that the chat took place.
It is not designed to be exposed to the internet at large. Instead, the primary intended means of use is to deploy it onto a new system (such as an EC2 instance), have user's SSH tunnel in (or use other supported methods) to use it and then discard the system once that chat has completed.
The provided client uses basic End To End encryption (currently using PGP as the encryption mechanism), and the server holds encrypted payloads in memory only (to ensure the ciphertext doesn't end up captured on the hosting provider's SAN for a time). Message payloads are purged after a short interval to help reduce the potential exposure were someone to be monitoring the server's memory.
Under no circumstances should you configure it to bind to `0.0.0.0` as doing so would allow adversaries to not only discover it, but to start probing it in order to try and establish whether it's in use (and who's using it). There should *always* be some additional step (i.e. being able to SSH into a server, or knowing exactly where to find it) required before access is available.
Over time, it will likely be hardened further, but it's unlikely it will ever be considered safe for completely unrestricted access - allowing discoverability would allow adversaries to establish likely meeting places in advance.
The most simple deployment method is to run the server component somewhere, and then simply run the client on the same system. The problem with this is it means that the E2E encryption keys are in memory on the same system as the server.
As a variation of this, if you do not want the server component to appear on the server's filesystem (you will still need to install dependancies though) then you can also create a reverse tunnel back to another machine. Just be aware that if the connection drops, the server will be unavailable, so ensure you've a reliable connection
Assuming `example.com` serves a publicly signed and trusted certificate (you'd hope it does), we'll also want to re-enable cert verification. So the client is called with verification enabled and being passed the URL to use for requests
Later versions will implement the ability to include auth headers in the request so that you can 404 unauthorised requests to the 'hidden' path. Until then, unless there's a particularly strong reason not to, the SSH methods described above are the recommended routes of access.